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Jani Raerinne (2011) and Lindley Darden (2013) argue that causal claims are not 
sufficiently explanatory, and causal talk should be replaced with mechanistic talk. I 
examine several examples from ecological research, two of which rely on causal models 
and structural equation modeling, to show that the assertions of Raerinne and of Darden 
have to be reconsidered.  
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1 Introduction  
 
The mechanistic perspective on scientific explanation is typically described as a reaction 
to the deductive-nomological view (Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
2005). The mechanistic perspective also defines itself by contrast to causal conceptions, 
and mechanisms are opposed to causes. Glennan (1996) seeks mechanisms to explain 
causation, while Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) – henceforth MDC – argue that 
the term “cause” is abstract and has to be specified in terms of more specific activities, 
such as push, carry, scrape, if it is to become meaningful. Subsequent developments 
integrate causation, in particular as conceived along counterfactual lines by Woodward 
(2000, 2003) to account for mechanisms. The work of Glennan (2002) and Craver (2007) 
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illustrates this approach, while Woodward (2002) himself proposes a counterfactual 
account of mechanisms, conceiving of them as networks of causal relations understood 
counterfactually. He continues this approach in a recent response (Woodward 2011) to 
Waskan’s (2011) arguments for maintaining mechanistic explanation distinct from 
counterfactual theories of explanation and causation.  
This article contributes to the aforementioned debate by scrutinizing two recent 
examinations of the relationship between causal claims and description of mechanisms in 
scientific explanations. Jani Raerinne (2011) examines representative cases of research 
by ecologists, and argues that in ecology many causal explanations are 
“phenomenological” invariant generalizations that do not offer satisfactory explanations. 
Mechanistic explanations of ecological phenomena could prove satisfactory, but such 
explanations in ecology are undetermined by data, and hence, fall short of expectations. 
Lindley Darden (2013) examines this issue too, but in the context of biology and 
medicine, with a special focus on the case of cystic fibrosis. Although she does not 
discuss ecological cases, it is important to examine her view, since she intends her 
conception of mechanisms and its relationship to causation to be general and applicable 
beyond the area of molecular and cell biology. Darden argues that causal claims of the 
kind “C causes E” do not offer satisfactory explanations, but descriptions of mechanisms 
do. Accordingly, causal talk has to be replaced with mechanistic talk in the sense of 
MDC.  
I question these claims of Raerinne and Darden and argue that both causal and 
mechanistic perspectives are necessary to formulate scientific explanations and to 
account for the explanatory practice of scientists. My reasoning is based on examination 
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of examples from ecology and it proceeds as follows: In section 2, I outline the views of 
Raerinne and Darden on mechanisms and causality. I formulate four theses that I think 
summarize their stances on these topics. After that, in section 3, I describe the use of 
structural equation modeling and of causal models for the study of causal structures. For 
illustration, I look at a study on pollination by Randal Mitchell and at a study on 
competition by Eric G. Lamb and James F. Cahill. In light of this examination, I show in 
section 4 that the four theses that I take to express the views of Raerinne and Darden do 
not characterize adequately the nature and use of causal claims in ecology and that 
mechanistic talk cannot replace causal talk. Instead, it has to incorporate it for successful 
explanations and to account for the explanatory practice of ecologists.  
 
2 Raerinne and Darden on Mechanisms and Causation 
 
Jani Raerinne takes up a distinction made in philosophical literature between two types of 
causal explanation that he calls “simple causal claims” and “mechanistic causal 
explanations”:  
A simple causal claim describes the causal connection between the phenomenon-
to-be-explained and the thing that does the explaining. It refers to a 
‘phenomenological’ or superficial causal explanation in which one has an 
invariant relation between variables, but no account — or mechanistic explanation 
— as to why or how the relation holds between the variables.” (Raerinne 2011, p. 
264)  
He understands causal claims and the corresponding causal relations in terms of 
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Woodward’s (2003) manipulationist account of causal explanation: causal claims 
describe causal dependency relationships between changes in the values of independent 
variables and changes in the values of dependent variables. To be explanatory, a causal 
claim has to be invariant under interventions on independent variables that bring about 
changes in the dependent variable.  
As the name suggests, mechanistic explanations consist of descriptions of 
mechanisms of phenomena; they are causal and bottom-up explanations. A mechanistic 
explanation “describes the underlying mechanism within the system by showing how the 
system is constituted and how this produces the phenomenon-to-be-explained” (Raerinne 
2011, p. 264). Just like causal explanations based on simple causal dependencies, 
mechanistic explanations are causal and rely on invariance and modularity. As for the 
relationship between the two types of explanation, Raerinne claims that mechanistic 
explanations complement causal explanations formulated in terms of simple causal 
claims, for the former describes how the dependency relation between the thing that does 
the explaining and the phenomenon-to-be-explained produces the latter. That is, a 
mechanism underlies a simple causal relationship, and a mechanistic explanation 
accounts for a simple causal relationship. Raerinne seems to conceive of mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanations as elaborate sets of simple causal relations and explanations, 
respectively, just like Woodward (2002) does with his counterfactual account of 
mechanisms.  
Raerinne views the situation of explanation in ecology as wanting because “many 
causal explanations in ecology are simple causal claims in the sense that there are no 
known or confirmed mechanistic explanations, for how the causes of these explanations 
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produce their effects” (2011, p. 267). He offers the several rules of the equilibrium theory 
of island biogeography ⎯ the area rule, the distance rule, the diversity-stability, the 
endemicity rule, and the intermediate disturbance rule ⎯ as illustrations of causal 
explanations in ecology. The rules of island biogeography are simple in the sense that 
they link two variables, where one variable is independent and represents the cause, while 
the other one is dependent and stands for the effect. That is, C causes E. For example, the 
area rule states that species numbers tend to increase with island area. Put in causal terms, 
the rule states that an increase in island area causes an increase in species numbers.  
The following two theses summarize the foregoing: 
R (1): Causal explanations in ecology consist of simple causal claims that offer 
“phenomenological” or superficial accounts of invariant dependency relations between 
variables, but no account of why or how the relationships hold.  
R (2): Mechanistic explanations ought to describe invariant and modular causal 
structures that underlie the phenomenon-to-be-explained.  
 In light of important cases of ecological research, I show in section 4 that R (1) 
does not apply to those cases and, hence, does not adequately characterize explanation in 
ecology. I agree with R (2), but Raerinne thinks that ecological mechanisms are 
undermined by data and poorly known. Ecologists have yet to offer accurate accounts of 
mechanisms. I disagree, given the examples of ecological research.  
Lindley Darden argues that claims such as “C causes E” are impoverished 
compared to the claim that “this mechanism produces this phenomenon.” The claim “A 
mutation in the CFTR gene causes cystic fibrosis” is impoverished by comparison to an 
account of the very large number of mechanisms involved in the production of the 
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disease (2013). She conceives of mechanisms in terms of a characterization that has 
become a locus classicus in the literature and is known as the MDC view: “Mechanisms 
are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from 
start or set up to finish or termination conditions” (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3).  
The problem with the talk in terms of “cause” and “effect” is that these words are 
general and they have to be specified by more specific causal terms. By doing so, one 
offers a more accurate account of scientific explanation. Darden shows how talk of 
“causes” and “effect” could be linked to “mechanism” and “phenomenon.” In a 
mechanism, causes could be specified as activities, a mechanism at a lower level, an 
earlier stage of the mechanism, or “start or setup conditions.” The effect is the 
phenomenon of interest that the mechanism produces (Darden 2013, pp. 24-26). 
Moreover, mechanisms are sought for three reasons: explanation, prediction, and control. 
Description of mechanisms goes through a process of recharacterization.  
The same cases of ecological research that I use to challenge Raerinne’s theses 
help me dispute two key claims that I think summarize Darden’s view on the explanatory 
value of causal claims and of descriptions of mechanisms: 
D (1): Causal claims of the form “C causes E” are impoverished claims about 
phenomena under scrutiny, while descriptions of underlying mechanisms sensu MDC 
offer satisfactory explanations.  
D (2): Causal talk has to be replaced with talk of activities, sub-mechanisms, 
stages and setup conditions.  
 In section 4, I show that D (1) does not accurately characterize ecologists’ use of 
causal claims and their role in formulating causal explanations. D (2) cannot be applied to 
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some population-level causal relationships and that renders causal-talk unavoidable. Note 
that R (1) and D (1) are similar in their assertion that causal claims do not offer 
satisfactory explanations. Only mechanistic explanations do. The two theses differ in that 
R (1) admits that causal explanations have some merit, even if “phenomenological,” or 
superficial, and this merit can be accounted for in terms of Woodward’s view on 
causation and causal explanation. By contrast, D (1) strips causal claims even of this 
virtue. Next, I examine the cases of ecological research that will help show the limitations 
of R (1), R (2), D (1) and D (2).  
 
 
3 Causal Explanations and Mechanism Description in the Study of 
Competition and Pollination 
 
Causal relationships and explanations are central in ecological research that employs 
structural equation modeling, or SEM for short. SEM is used to infer causes from 
observational, statistical data, to test causal hypotheses and to help formulate new 
hypotheses concerning causal structures (Shipley 2002; Grace 2006). As such, SEM 
method leads to causal explanations of ecological phenomena. That this method is 
important in ecology is evidenced by its recent use in the investigation of various 
ecological problems, such as effects of natural selection (Scheiner et al. 2000), individual 
and environmental variability in observed populations (Cubaynes et al. 2012), the effect 
of competition on the life-history and fecundity of wild and hybrid or cultivated plant 
populations (Campbell and Snow 2007; Pantone et al. 1992), the effects of seeding 
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density on plant and panicle density and on final yield (Lamb et al. 2011), the strength of 
the interactions among species in natural communities, such as the strength of the direct 
and indirect effect of birds on other species of an intertidal community (Wootton 1994), 
the importance of male-male competition, female choice and male-female conflict in 
water striders (Sih et al. 2002), plant species richness in coastal wetlands (Grace and 
Pugesek 1997), the effect of plant biomass on seed number and germination success 
(Allison 2002), the factors that determine reproductive success and plantlet survival 
(Iriondo et al. 2003), the interspecific relationships between functional traits in 
succession (Vile et al. 2006), the ecological structures and the role of ecological 
processes (Arhonditsis et al. 2006), the direct and indirect effects of climate and habitat 
diversity on butterfly diversity (Menéndez et al. 2007), the environmental drivers of 
disease emergence (Plowright et al. 2008), and the effect of humans on terrestrial food 
webs (Muhly et al. 2013). 
The first step in SEM is to conjecture causal relationships among variables in 
light of available knowledge about the phenomenon under scrutiny and to formulate a 
path model incorporating the conjectured causal relationships. Causal relationships are 
described by parameters that show the magnitude of the direct or indirect effect that 
independent variables (observed or latent) exert on dependent variables (observed or 
latent). In graphical representations, arrows of varying thickness indicate the magnitude 
of the effect exerted by independent variables. The proposed model of the conjectured 
causal relationships is then tested for fit with the observed data using a χ2 test of model 
fit, and it is rejected if it does not agree with the data. Structural equations are used to 
calculate the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. For example, 
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structural equations (figure 1) calculate the values of the dependent variables linked by 
causal relations in a path model (figure 2).1 The equations are interpreted causally in the 
sense that manipulations of x yield changes in the value of y, provided that there is no 
other path from y to x. 
 
Fig. 1 Structural equations that underlie a path diagram shown in figure 2. From Grace 
(2006, p. 11). Structural equation modeling and natural systems. Copyright  2006 
Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission.     
 
Fig. 2 A path model associated with structural equations depicted in figure 1. From Grace 
(2006, p. 11). Structural equation modeling and natural systems. Copyright  2006 
Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission. 
 
 Randal Mitchell (1992, 1994) used SEM to examine casual relationships and to 
test hypotheses about the causal relationships between floral traits, pollination visitation, 
plant size and fruit production. He first formulated a path diagram, which is a causal 
                                                
1 In this model, boxes stand for observed variables, while arrows designate directional 
relationships. The latter are represented by equality signs in the structural equations. γ 
designates effects of x variables on y variables, β stand for effects of ys on other ys, and ζ 
indicate error terms for response variables (Grace 2006, p. 11). 
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model, of various causal relations possible between floral traits, pollinator behavior and 
fruit production, and which were conjectured based on prior knowledge of the case 
(figure 3). He then changed this scheme and produced a total of six causal diagrams by 
deleting or adding to it causal relations, as shown in figure 3. The six models that 
Mitchell examined express six different conjectures regarding the causal relations among 
the foregoing factors. Using structural equations and testing the six conjectured causal 
models for fit with the observed data, he eliminated five conjectures and their models, 
and identified the causal diagram that better fits the data. That diagram expresses the 
basic hypothesis according to which plant traits (floral nectar production rate, corolla 
size, number of open flowers, and inflorescent height) affect pollinator behavior 
(approaches and probes per flower), which may influence plant reproductive success 
through fruit production (proportion fruit set and total fruit set) (figure 4).  
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Fig. 3 Initial model containing various possible causal paths between floral traits, 
pollinator behavior and fruit production. From Mitchell (1994, p. 875). Effects of floral 
traits, pollinator visitation, and plant size on Ipomopsis aggregata fruit production. The 
American Naturalist 143 (5): 870-889; published by The University of Chicago Press for 
The American Society of Naturalists. Reprinted by permission of The University of 
Chicago Press. 
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Fig. 4 Solved path diagram supporting the basic hypothesis. From Mitchell (1994, p. 
879). Effects of floral traits, pollinator visitation, and plant size on Ipomopsis aggregata 
fruit production. The American Naturalist 143 (5): 870-889; published by The University 
of Chicago Press for The American Society of Naturalists. Reprinted by permission of 
The University of Chicago Press. 
 
The solved path diagram (figure 4) shows that the causal relationship established 
in this case is not the simple “C causes E,” but rather the complex of positive causal 
relations of various strength: “[((C1, & C2, & C3 & C4 & C5&U) cause B1) & ((B1 &U) 
cause B2) & ((C4 & B1 & B2 & U) cause PS) & ((DM&U) cause C4) & ((DM & U) cause 
TF) & (TF & PS & U)] cause E,” where C1-5 are corolla length, corolla width, nectar 
production, inflorescence height, number of open flowers, respectively; U symbolizes 
unknown factors; DM represents dry mass; TF indicates total flowers, and PS is 
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proportion fruit set; B1 stands for pollinator approaches, and B2 for probes per flower, and 
E is the effect total fruit. (To keep the expression more manageable, I did not include here 
the negative causal relations.) To underscore that Mitchell uses the causal approach, it is 
worth mentioning that he explicitly takes the model to be one about causal relationships 
and causal mechanisms, which is an expression that he uses to designate networks of 
causal relationships (Mitchell 1992, pp. 123, 124).  
A related example is due to Eric G. Lamb and James F. Cahill (2008) who 
likewise used SEM to examine the importance of the intensity of root competition in a 
rough fescue grassland community in structuring plant species diversity or community 
composition.2 They used structural equation modeling to examine how competition 
influences species richness, composition, and evenness, by situating these characteristics 
of communities within a wider set of environmental and plant conditions that are known 
to influence competition intensity and community structure, as shown in the path model 
(figure 5). This initial model contains only species richness as the dependent variable of 
primary interest because including evenness and composition in a single model would 
make it too complex. Instead, separate models for evenness and species composition were 
formulated. 
                                                
2 Lamb and Cahill define intensity of competition as “the degree to which competition for 
a limited resource reduces plant performance below the physiological maximum 
achievable in a given environment.” Importance of competition is “the effect of 
competition relative to other environmental conditions. … competition can be considered 
important if variation in the intensity of competition is the cause of predictable variation 
in plant community structure”(Lamb and Cahill Jr 2008, p. 778). 
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Fig. 5 Initial structural equation model. From Lamb and Cahill (2008, p. 781). When 
Competition Does Not Matter: Grassland Diversity and Community Composition. The 
American Naturalist 171 (6): 777-787; published by The University of Chicago Press for 
The American Society of Naturalists. Reprinted by permission of The University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
A χ2 test of model fit showed that the model does not fit the data adequately. To address 
this issue, Lamb and Cahill added new paths to models. The resulting models are 
represented in figure 6. In the species richness model, they introduced direct paths from 
site conditions to shoot biomass, soil moisture to species richness and from nitrogen 
treatment to soil moisture (figure 6.A). The starting value of the path from total nitrogen 
to the site conditions variable was modified, which led to an adequate fit of the model for 
species evenness (figure 6.B). To address the fit of the model for species composition, 
they added a path from community composition to light interception (figure 6.C). 
Evenness, richness and composition had varying influence on root and shoot biomass and 
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this in turn affected the coefficients of variables linked by paths to shoot and root 
biomass. 
 
Fig. 6 Solved structural equation models for species richness (A), species evenness (B), 
and plant community composition (C). Dotted arrows represent paths that are not 
significant, while continuous arrows denote significant paths. The thickness of arrows 
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indicates the degree of significance, which is also shown by coefficients. Thicker arrows 
represent more significant paths, while thinner ones stand for less significant ones. This 
graphical representation shows the causal relations and the factors that affect the 
dependent variables of community structure. From Lamb and Cahill Jr (2008, p. 783). 
When Competition Does Not Matter: Grassland Diversity and Community Composition. 
The American Naturalist 171 (6): 777-787; published by The University of Chicago Press 
for The American Society of Naturalists. Reprinted by permission of The University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
  
 Lamb and Cahill formulate these findings in terms that indicate a causal 
interpretation. They say that nitrogen treatment and soil moisture are the factors that 
“positively influence” species richness. Competitive intensity is the factor that in addition 
to nitrogen treatment and soil moisture “positively influence” species evenness. As for 
community composition, it is affected by environmental conditions, i.e., site conditions, 
and, in its turn, is linked to shoot and root biomass. In all three cases, species competitive 
ability, which is based on phytometer species identity, influences competition intensity. 
Furthermore, “[e]nvironmental conditions strongly controlled shoot and to a lesser extent 
root biomass, and a combination of environmental conditions and plant biomass exerted 
strong control on light interception and soil moisture” (Lamb and Cahill Jr 2008, pp. 782-
784). Moreover, when reviewing the contribution of other authors to the problem they 
study, Lamb and Cahill say: “…competition can be considered important if variation in 
the intensity of competition is the cause of predictable variation in plant community 
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structure.”; “Plant community structure is generally under the control of complex 
networks of interaction among factors ranging from soil and environmental conditions to 
disturbance regimes, herbivory, litter and standing shoot biomass.”; “…competition is an 
important factor controlling plant community diversity and competition in rough fescue 
grassland.”3  
 In the next section, I examine the implications that the research by Mitchell, 
Lamb and Cahill has for the theses of Raerinne and Darden.    
 
  
4 R (1) & R (2), D (1) & D (2) versus Ecological Research 
 
Research of Mitchell, and of Lamb and Cahill shows that neither R (1) nor D (1) 
adequately characterize the causal claims that they make and their explanatory role. 
Being good examples of the use of SEM to articulate explanations of ecological 
phenomena, their work indicates that explanations in ecology do not consist only of 
simple causal claims, but complex causal claims that can be assimilated to descriptions of 
mechanisms. I look first at the example of Mitchell, and then turn to Lamb and Cahill. 
The causal claim that Mitchell makes is not about a simple, binary “C causes E” 
relationship, as both R (1) and D (1) would make us expect, but rather about the more 
complex “[((C1, & C2, & C3 & C4 & C5&U) cause B1) & ((B1 & U) cause B2) & ((C4 
& B1 & B2 & U) cause PS) & ((DM & U) cause C4) & ((DM & U) cause TF) & (TF & 
PS & U)] cause E,” and that is expressed by a causal model (figure 4). Although this 
                                                
3 Italics added throughout the paragraph for emphasis.  
Pâslaru - Causal and Mechanistic Explanation  18 
claim captures a dependency relationship, it is not a superficial, or impoverished one as 
the relationship that would only relate two variables, say, the probes per flower to the 
proportion fruit set. Instead, Mitchell’s causal model is a complex model that cites six 
properties of flowers, two types of pollinator behaviors, and causal relationships, and that 
links all of these causal factors in a certain way to account for the relationship between 
pollinator behavior and fruit production. The simple number of causal factors and their 
causal structure that Mitchell cites to account for the phenomenon under scrutiny ⎯ 
amount of total fruits ⎯ is on a par with descriptions of mechanisms that are not 
superficial or impoverished. Another reason for speaking against the superficiality of 
Mitchell’s complex causal claim, and for the inadequacy of R (1) and D (1) in this case, 
is the fact that it is a result of testing six causal diagrams that expressed six different 
hypotheses about the causal relationships among factors responsible for fruit production. 
Those tests ruled out five of the conjectured causal links. The remaining sixth diagram is 
a complex causal claim that does not just express an observed correlation.  
 The work of Lamb and Cahill offers another ground for the inadequacy of R (1) 
and D (1) in the context of causal explanations in ecology. They examined three causal 
relations that both Raerinne and Darden would deem as simple, superficial and 
impoverished: “competition intensity controls species richness,” “competition intensity 
controls species evenness,” and “competition intensity controls community composition.” 
However, Lamb and Cahill examined each of these relationships in the context of a 
network of interactions among environmental and community factors (soil and 
topographical position, nitrogen treatment) to assess the importance of competition 
intensity. Their research established that competition intensity affects species evenness, 
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but not richness or community composition. They also established how significant are the 
paths connecting other factors, such as site conditions, soil moisture, etc. to the dependent 
variables of interest. Last, but not the least, their work showed that for the initial model of 
causal paths to account for the observed data, they had to add several paths. In particular, 
in all three models (figure 6) they added a path from topographical position to light 
interception, and another path from soil moisture to the dependent variable, and a path 
from nitrogen treatment to soil moisture. The final model for community composition 
adds a link between light interception and community composition. The addition of these 
paths that represent in the model causal relations is an indication of the fact that 
competition intensity is not the only cause of species evenness, richness, or community 
composition and that other factors are instrumental as well. This example shows that 
ecologists examine even simple causal relations in a complex and structured network of 
causal factors. Simple causal relations are explanatory precisely because they are situated 
in such a causal network. Considering Lamb and Cahill’s simple causal relationships in 
this context, they turn out to be anything but superficial or impoverished.  
 I claimed earlier that I accept R (2), but disagree with Raerinne on the empirical 
support for this thesis. R (2) is a normative statement, but the practice of ecologists, he 
argues, shows that “most explanation in ecology are undetermined by data or lacking in 
data” and “there are no known or confirmed mechanistic explanations” (Raerinne 2011, 
p. 267). Fortunately, causal diagrams that are part and parcel of SEM and exemplified by 
Mitchell, Lamb and Cahill vindicate R (2). Raerinne accepts Woodward’s counterfactual 
account of representations of mechanisms as account of mechanistic explanation. Since R 
(2) simply expresses Woodward’s conception of explanation, I argue that R (2) is correct 
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by showing that the aforementioned causal models satisfy Woodward’s counterfactual 
account of mechanisms and stress the empirical support of the models.  
 Woodward defines representations of mechanisms as follows:  
(MECH) a necessary condition for a representation to be an acceptable model of 
a mechanism is that the representation (i) describe an organized or structured set 
of parts or components, where (ii) the behavior of each component is described by 
a generalization that is invariant under interventions, and where (iii) the 
generalizations governing each component are also independently changeable, 
and where (iv) the representation allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) and 
(iii), the overall output of the mechanism will vary under manipulation of the 
input to each component and changes in the components themselves. (2002, p. 
S375) 
The causal path diagrams that Mitchell, Lamb and Cahill use satisfy MECH. The 
gist of MECH is that a mechanism should be decomposable into parts or modules that 
can be independently changed and the overall output of the mechanism varies as a result 
of changes to the modules. Each diagram used in the ecological examples I examined 
represents an organized set of components and their behaviors (i). In Mitchell’s example, 
for instance, the solved path diagram is an organized set of features of plants and 
behaviors of pollinators. Each component and behavior is described by generalizations 
that link them to other components and/or behaviors (ii). The behavior ‘approaches’ is 
described as dependent on corolla length, corolla width, nectar production, plant height 
and open flowers. The generalization describes the link between approaches and the rest 
of components and behaviors as invariant under interventions. One can change, say, the 
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corolla length, and that will affect approaches, yet the relationship between the two will 
stay invariant, as long as changes to corolla length are within a certain range. 
Furthermore, one can change the link between nectar production and approaches 
independently from the link between corolla width and approaches (iii). And the entire 
causal diagram allows us to see how the overall output of total fruits varies as a result of 
manipulating components and behaviors that make up the organized set of components 
and behaviors that the causal diagram represents (iv). Since Woodward takes MECH to 
specify the conditions for a model to be an acceptable representation of a mechanism, and 
causal diagrams used by ecologists satisfy MECH, as explained above, it follows that the 
causal graphs are models of mechanisms, and the explanations articulated by their means 
are mechanistic explanations.  
The use of causal models in ecology also addresses Raerinne’s concern about the 
lack of empirical support of mechanistic explanations in ecology. He does not elaborate 
on the standards of confirmation or of the relationship between data and mechanistic 
explanation, but the cases that I considered offer reasons to be optimistic about the 
empirical support of mechanistic explanations. Mitchell tested six models for fit with 
observational data, rejected five of them and settled on the one that better accounted for 
the data (figure 4). Lamb and Cahill tested their models for fit with observational data as 
well, and had to modify them, producing a version that better fits the data (figure 6). In 
addition, all models in both cases were formulated in light of prior empirical knowledge 
about the organisms under scrutiny.  
 Employment of causal models in ecological explanations offers several reasons to 
question D (2). I explain these reasons against the backdrop of assuming that “causal 
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talk” is more than thinking in terms of “C causes E” and articulating such reasoning, but 
it comprises causal modeling as illustrated in section 3. First, causal models satisfy 
important features of mechanistic explanation that Darden defends. Second, causal talk 
cannot be replaced with talk of activities, sub-mechanisms, stages, and set-up conditions. 
Here is the more detailed examination of these reasons.  
 According to Darden’s characterization of mechanisms, mechanisms (a) produce 
a phenomenon, (b) consist of entities and activities, (c) that are organized spatially and 
temporally, (d) description of the mechanism goes through recharacterization and 
reevaluation, and (e) mechanisms are sought for explanation, prediction, and control. In 
line with (a), Mitchell’s causal models show what factors produce reproductive success in 
plants, i.e., total fruit sets, while the models by Lamb and Cahill reveal what factors are 
responsible for variation in species diversity and community composition. That is, the 
phenomena for which causal models are sought are total fruit sets, in one case, and 
species diversity and community composition, in the other case. As required by (b), 
causal models represent both entities and activities. Mitchell’s models list approaches and 
probes per flower, nectar production, which are activities, and the entities flowers, 
corolla, and fruit set. Moreover, to offer a more detailed account, the models contain 
properties of entities: length, width, and height. Similarly, Lamb and Cahill list light 
interception as an activity of main interest, and the entities coupled with their properties: 
shoot biomass, soil moisture, total nitrogen, etc. Causal models under scrutiny focus 
primarily on the causal organization of entities and activities. The models are careful to 
specify which entity, property or activity is at the receiving end and which one exerts the 
causal influence, for any change in this organization can result in a causal model that 
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does not account for the phenomenon under scrutiny. It matters for the adequacy of the 
model whether dry mass affects total fruits directly, or via height and total flowers (figure 
4). Likewise, it matters whether it is shoot biomass that affects soil moisture, rather than 
vice versa (figure 6). While the causal organization is a constitutive one and does not 
stress the spatial and temporal organization, the latter are implied, and should they play 
an important role in producing a phenomenon, they can be easily incorporated in causal 
models. For example, Mitchell’s solved model (figure 5) indicates temporal organization 
when it implies that probes per flower have to occur before a plant can produce fruits. 
Lamb and Cahill’s model (figure 6) shows that spatial organization can be explicitly 
incorporated in the model as suggested by the variable topological position. Causal 
models contain those organizational aspects that researchers find relevant in the cases 
they investigate. Figures 5 and 6 emphasize causal organization, while other causal 
models can incorporate spatial and/or temporal organization if deemed relevant. What is 
important is that entities and activities are organized, and this matches the spirit of (c). 
Description of the aforementioned causal models goes through recharacterization and 
reevaluation, as described by (d). Any formulation of a causal model begins with a 
tentative model that is modified following tests for fit with data, even if the terminology 
used to refer to the two types of models is different from the one applied to the case of 
mechanisms. Mitchell calls the tentative model a hypothetical causal scheme, while the 
final one is a solved path diagram. Darden uses sketch and schemata, correspondingly. 
While a sketch of a mechanism contains black boxes for components to be identified, a 
hypothetical causal schema contains more causal relations than there are, or misses some, 
yet both are similar in that they explore possible structures and are tentative. 
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Furthermore, a solved path diagram is the final destination of an investigation that uses 
SEM, just as a scheme filled in with descriptions of the relevant parts and entities is the 
end result of mechanistic accounts.  
Neither Mitchell nor Cahill and Lamb discuss the use of their models for the 
purpose of predicting outcomes of intervention in nature or for controlling nature. Their 
primary goal is to use causal models to explain reproductive success in plants and why 
root competition is not important in determining species richness and community 
composition. Yet since findings of ecology are used in practical applications, such as 
conservation and restoration which involve prediction and control, their causal models 
can be seen as suitable for such applications. In fact, other ecologists use causal models 
for prediction, explanation and management, as shown by the work of James B. Grace 
(Grace and Pugesek 1997; Grace 2008, 2006). Consequently, causal models are sought 
for explanation, prediction, and control, just as (e) requires of mechanisms. Causal talk 
using the language of causal models is far from being poor; it satisfies the desiderata of 
the mechanistic view. 
 I turn next to showing that causal talk understood in the broader sense as 
illustrated above cannot be replaced with talk of activities, sub-mechanisms, and set-up 
conditions. In fact, the latter require the former.  
 MDC characterize mechanisms using qualitative models of them, yet models of 
this kind have limitations: they do not contain quantitative information that enables 
prediction. (For a related objection see Gebharter and Kaiser (2014, pp. 82-83)). Darden 
(2013) admits the use of computational simulation models for quantitative predictions (p. 
23), but these models are not causal. Causal models used in SEM, however, combine both 
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qualitative and quantitative virtues. They are able to represent all the relevant 
characteristics of mechanisms along with path coefficients that are necessary for 
prediction and explanation. The MDC view cannot do this, since it does not accept causal 
models as necessary elements of final mechanistic explanation, but requires causes to be 
specified as activities, and is not working with path coefficients. For the MDC view to be 
more comprehensive, it has to integrate causal models and path coefficients.  
  Woodward questioned the ability of the mechanistic view such as the one 
proposed by MDC to account for the overall relationship between start and termination 
conditions using bottom out activities. The overall relationship is not an activity, and it is 
not plausible to claim that it is productive if the start condition is connected to the 
termination condition via a series of intermediate activities (Woodward 2002, pp. S372-
S373). This objection is particularly important in connection with examples from ecology 
where the relationship between start and termination conditions is the focus of 
investigation rather than the intermediate activities, or is as important as the latter. 
Ecologists are interested in how changes in start conditions, such as availability of 
nutrients, prey, predators, or changes in environmental conditions, or in initial densities 
of populations affect termination conditions such as competitive exclusion, or lack 
thereof, increase or decrease in the abundance of a population, or co-occurrence of two 
species. To show this, I will consider an example of experimental research on 
competition by David Tilman and David Wedin (1991). They examined the mechanisms 
of nitrogen competition among four grass species by planting Agrostis scabra in pair with 
three other grass species: Agropyron repens, Schizachyrium scoparium and Andropogon 
gerardi. Grass pairs were subjected to several environmental conditions and treatments. 
Pâslaru - Causal and Mechanistic Explanation  26 
In particular, they modified the soil composition and produced eight mixtures containing 
different proportions of topsoil; they used three seedling ratios of grasses of different 
species (80% and 20%, 20% and 80%, 50% and 50%); and three levels of nitrogen 
treatment, which was the only limiting resource. Two seedling densities (3000 and 600 
seedlings/m2) were used to examine the competition between two grass species: Agrostis 
scabra and Agropyron repens, but only one seedling density (3000 seedlings/m2) was 
used to study pairwise competition between three species: Agrostis scabra and 
Schizachyrium scoparium and Andropogon gerardi. Except in a few cases, the common 
outcome of these experiments was the competitive displacement of Agrostis. When 
paired with Schizachyrium or Andropogon, Agrostis was displaced independent of initial 
seedling ratios and despite the fact that it inhibited the growth of the other two species in 
1986 and 1987 (figure 7). Agropyron almost displaced Agrostis on nitrogen level (N-
level) 3, but persisted on levels 1 and 2 (figure 8), which points to the two species having 
similar competitive abilities. Tilman and Wedin explain the dynamics of competition in 
mechanistic terms. Schizachyrium and Andropogon displaced Agrostis because they have 
higher root biomass and are better nitrogen competitors than Agrostis. The former species 
are poor colonists, for they produce few seeds. By contrast, Agrostis allocates resources 
to seed production and is as a result a successful colonist of abandoned fields and 
occupies them in the first two years. Agropyron is a good colonist as well due to high 
allocation to rhizomes through which it spreads. The determinant factor that allows 
Agropyron to displace Agrostis is that it produces rhizomes that can penetrate deep litter, 
while Agrostis cannot do that.  
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Fig. 7 Dynamics of competition between Agrostis and Schizachyrium, and between 
Agrostis and Andropogon on three levels of nitrogen and in plots with different seed 
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densities. From Tilman and Wedin (1991, p. 1042). Dynamics of nitrogen competition 
between successional grasses. Ecology 72 (3):1038-1049. Copyright by the Ecological 
Society of America.  
 
Fig. 8 Dynamics of competition between Agrostis and Agropyron at high and low seed 
density and on three nitrogen levels. From Tilman and Wedin (1991, p. 1045). Dynamics 
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of nitrogen competition between successional grasses. Ecology 72 (3):1038-1049. 
Copyright by the Ecological Society of America.  
  
Description of mechanisms responsible for the dynamics of competition does not 
eliminate the need to specify an overall causal relationship, as a closer examination of the 
work of Tilman and Wedin shows. They investigate how changes in the start conditions – 
planting of seeds of two different species – affect the termination condition of 
competitive exclusion. This overall relationship is causal in the manipulationist sense of 
causation.  Displacement is an effect of the initial planting of two species with different 
competitive abilities. Had only one species been present, or had one intervened to 
eliminate one of the two species, there would have been no competitive exclusion. MDC 
requires specifying causes as activities. However, there is no productive activity that links 
the start condition directly to the termination condition of competitive displacement, and 
MDC lacks an alternative concept of causation that would account for the overall causal 
relationship. Yet it is important to acknowledge this causal relationship, since it is the 
focus of Tilman and Wedin’s examination, and it is required for understanding their 
research. They describe the productive activities that plants engage in, as well as the 
mechanisms that they constitute to account for the overall relationship that they 
determine experimentally. This relationship also guides the identification of productive 
activities and mechanisms. Had they investigated a different phenomenon, they would 
have either identified different activities and mechanisms, or used them differently in 
their account. Moreover, this overall causal relationship illustrates numerous other similar 
overall causal relationships that ecologists scrutinize, such as the quality of the 
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environment and the type of interaction between plants; biodiversity and the risk of 
cascading extinctions; the distance between islands and mainland and rate of immigration 
or extinction; and the presence of mycorrhizal fungus and species composition and 
diversity. 
 Description only of individual activities that make up the productive continuity 
does not reveal another aspect of the overall causal relationship that Tilman and Wedin 
see as important. They observe that the long-term outcome of competition, i.e., 
displacement of Agrostis was independent of changes in initial conditions, such as seed 
densities and abundances although they influenced the dynamics of pairwise interaction 
(Tilman and Wedin 1991, p. 1046). Schizachyrium displaced Agrostis regardless of 
whether the initial abundance of the latter in a plot was at 80%, 50%, or 20% (figure 7 A, 
B and C). When planted both at high and low seed density, Agrostis reached ultimately 
very low biomass, less than 5 g/m2, which amounts to displacement. Moreover, figures 7 
and 8 also show that the variation in nitrogen level had an effect on the dynamics of 
interaction between pairs of species, but did not cancel competitive displacement. For 
example, plots with initial seed density of 50% of Agrostis had on N-level 2 a biomass of 
20 g/m2 in 1986, of about 60 g/m2 in 1987, but 0 g/m2 in 1988. On N-level 3, however, 
Agrostis had a biomass of 50 g/m2 1986, about 70 g/m2 in 1987, but only 1 g/m2 in 1988 
(figure 7 B and C). Articulated in terms of Woodward’s (2006) account of insensitivity of 
causation, this is an overall causal relationship between initial conditions and competitive 
displacement that is invariant and insensitive to changes in seed densities, seed 
abundances, and nitrogen level. Yet, as I already showed, the mechanistic conception 
focused on activities does not have the means to account for the overall causal 
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relationship. Arguably, it could offer a schema of the overall causal relationship, schemas 
being truncated abstract descriptions that can be completed with additional descriptions 
of known parts and activities. This solution is unlikely to work, because the mechanistic 
view does not have the notions of insensitivity and invariance. Even if it assumed them, a 
schema of the overall causal relationship would be constructed by removing details about 
it, but the notion of insensitivity and invariance does not remove the detail. Instead, it 
specifies the changes to which the relationship is insensitive and invariant. 
 From the foregoing it follows that the causal talk cannot be replaced in with talk 
of activities, sub-mechanisms, stages and set-up conditions. Instead, causal talk has to 
complement the latter. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In the foregoing sections, I showed that four theses on the relationship between causal 
relations and mechanisms, and between causal and mechanistic explanations that can be 
found in the articles by Raerinne and Darden are not applicable to some important cases 
of ecological research. Ecologists do more than just cite simple causal dependencies, and 
even when they focus on simple causal relationships, they are investigated as part of 
complex causal networks. As a result, the explanations that the causal models articulate 
are not superficial or trivial. Rather, ecologists’ explanations often consist of complex 
causal claims articulated by means of intricate causal models. Furthermore, causal talk 
cannot be replaced with a mechanistic discourse sensu MDC. Instead, it is necessary to 
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produce a more complete account of the mechanisms underlying the phenomena under 
scrutiny. Causal models used in SEM represent the features of mechanisms as required by 
MDC and, in addition, incorporate quantitative information required for prediction and 
explanation. They also capture the overall causal relationship between start and 
termination conditions, as well as its invariance and insensitivity. 
 Woodward (2011) argues that a more adequate characterization of the notion of 
mechanisms, that is necessary to account for scientific explanation, could result from 
integrating aspects of both causal and mechanistic perspectives. The foregoing 
examination lends support to Woodward’s proposal. Causal perspective is a necessary 
element in formulating mechanistic explanations of ecological and of other similar 
phenomena. If the term causal is reserved for counterfactual accounts that seek to 
establish dependency relationships between two events, use causal models and SEM, but 
without consideration of the intimate connection between the cause and its effect; and 
mechanistic is reserved for accounts that look at the productive activities that link the 
cause and the effect, then the ecological examples show that both are needed to furnish an 
explanation.  
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